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INTRODUCTION

Modern environmental laws, particularly those dealing with
the achievement of clean air and water and the disposal of hazardous substances, create a web of interconnected, often complimentary, but sometimes overlapping and conflicting federal and
state programs. The Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA)' and the2
NewJersey Spill Compensation and Control Act (the Spill Act),
establish both financial responsibility schemes for the cleanup of
contaminated sites, and strict, joint and several liability against
all parties involved in the discharge of hazardous substances.
* Mr. Hoffman is a partner at Hannoch Weisman in Roseland, New Jersey and
an Adjunct Professor of Law at Seton Hall University School of Law. Mr. Hoffman
served as the technical advisor to this Environmental Law Symposium.

I Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980)[hereinafter CERCLA] (codified as
amended by the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act, Pub. L. No. 99499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986) [hereinafter SARA]), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1982 &
Supp. IV 1987). CERCLA is commonly known as "Superfund."
2 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:10-23.11f (West 1990).
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This article focuses on one aspect of this dual statutory structure,
requiring the cleanup of contaminated sites by both the federal
government and the State of New Jersey (the State).
The experience of the past decade has been that, even with
the governmental weapons of strict, joint and several liability,
preclusion of pre-enforcement appellate review,3 and treble damages for noncompliance, 4 progress in the remediation of contaminated sites has been painfully slow. The federal government
3 SARA § 113(h), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h)(1982 & Supp. IV 1987); see also Woodlands Private Study Group v. New Jersey DEP, 616 F. Supp. 794 (D.N.J. 1985).
In Woodlands, the court outlined the three stage process for reviewing an alleged discharger's reimbursement claim under the New Jersey Spill Act. Id. at 808.
This process can be initiated only after the alleged discharger has complied with
the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection's directive to pay the
amount incurred in the cleanup. Specifically, the court explained that:
The Spill Act provides for three stages of review of claims against the
Spill Fund. First, for a period after all affected parties are notified of a
claim, the chief executive of the Spill Fund, the "administrator," is
encouraged to settle claims. Second, claims are to be considered by
"boards of arbitration" consisting of one or three persons. Finally, a
claimant may seek judicial review of the decision of an arbitration
board.
Id. (citations omitted).
The court then concluded that even though the Spill Act's arbitration system
undeniably precludes an alleged discharger from pre-enforcement judicial review,
it does not violate constitutional due process requirements. Id. at 810. The court
declared that "there is no constitutional requirement that [the testing of the validity
of an administrative order] be made in one tribunal rather than another, so long as
there is an opportunity to be heard and judicial review which satisfies the demands
of due process ..
" Id. at 807 (quoting Vakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 444
(1944)).
4 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:10-23.1lf(a) (West 1982 & Supp. 1990) ("[Any discharger who fails to comply with such a directive shall be liable to the department
in an amount equal to three times the cost of the removal.").
Courts have maintained that treble damages under the Spill Act are imposed in
circumstances where there is "a finding of (a) responsibility for the alleged discharge, and (b) a knowing refusal to comply with a DEP directive." Woodlands, 616
F. Supp. at 801. But see CERCLA § 10 7 (c)(3) (1980), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(c)(3) (1982).
CERCLA's treble damage provision differs in that it provides:
If any person who is liable for a release of a hazardous substance fails
without sufficient cause to properly provide removal or remedial action
upon order . . . such person may be liable to the United States for

punitive damages in an amount at least equal to and not more than
three times the amount of any cost incurred by the Fund as a result of
such failure to take proper action.
Id. (emphasis added).
Some courts have interpreted the statutory language "without sufficient cause"
to allow an alleged discharger to raise a "good faith" defense in an attempt to
defeat an award of treble damages. Woodlands, 616 F. Supp. at 801. See also United
States v. Reilly Tar & Chem. Corp., 606 F. Supp. 412, 421 (D. Minn. 1985) (good
faith defense can preclude an imposition of punitive damages under CERCLA without violating due process); Wagner Elec. Corp. v. Thomas, 612 F. Supp. 736, 744
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eventually recognized that negotiated settlements with potentially responsible parties (PRPs) could provide as expeditious an
avenue to remediation as administrative or judicial enforcement. 5
Congress reacted by codifying the United States Environmental
Protection Agency's (USEPA) settlement policies and adding several statutory provisions with the 1986 reauthorization of CERCLA. 6 Oddly enough, while the New Jersey Department of
Environmental Protection (NJDEP) engages in negotiations with
PRPs to remediate sites both under the Spill Act, and pursuant to
its derivative authority under CERCLA,7 no statutory authority
or administrative guidance exists to motivate or accomplish
settlements.
The purpose of this article is twofold: to examine the federal
policies and incentives for negotiated settlements, and to compare the settlement process in New Jersey where no express settlement policy exists under state law. This stark difference is
significant because New Jersey acts, in most cases, primarily as
the agent of the federal government. While there is ample state
authority to enable the NJDEP to act on its own, federal financing
impels it to assume "lead agency" status. 8 Consequently, PRPs
who are willing to negotiate are faced with the prospect of dealing with state authorities at federally sponsored sites, but receive
none of the advantages offered to those who settle under federal
law. Understanding the ramifications of this problem may be facilitated by a brief description of CERCLA and the Spill Act.
II.

THE SPILL ACT AND

CERCLA

The Spill Act was passed in 1976, and was in part, a model
for CERCLA. It prohibits and provides for the remediation of
any discharge of a hazardous substance 9 unless in accordance
(D. Kan. 1985) (good faith defense under CERCLA satisfies due process
requirements).
5 See United States Environmental Protection Agency's (USEPA), Interim CERCLA Settlement Policy, 50 Fed. Reg. 5034 (1985) ("[W]e believe that this policy
will substantially benefit the public by encouraging responsible parties to undertake
appropriate and long term remedies through settlement.").
See also United States v. Acton Corp., 733 F. Supp. 869, 872 (D.N.J. 1990) (in
granting motion for entry of consent decree setting forth liability of each PRP
"[plublic policy, as reflected in CERCLA, clearly favors settlement of [a] case").
6 See SARA § 122 (1986), 42 U.S.C. § 9622 (1988) (empowering the President
to enter into settlements).
7 See infra note 18 and accompanying text.
8 Id.
9 A hazardous substance is defined under the Spill Act as:
[T]hose elements and compounds, including petroleum products
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with a federal or state permit.' ° The liability for a discharge is
strict, joint and several, and extends not only to the discharger
but to any person who "is in any way responsible for the discharge."" The NJDEP itself may perform a remediation financed by the Spill Fund, after which it could either seek cost
recovery from the discharger or direct the discharger to perform
the cleanup. 2 A discharger who fails to comply
with such a di3
rective can be held liable for treble damages.'
CERCLA, commonly known as "Superfund," was enacted in
1980 and was substantially amended by the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA).' 4 CERCLA prohibits the release of hazardous substances 15 into the environment
and is generally, but not necessarily, applicable to inactive sites.
It imposes :trict liability on a broad class of PRPs.' 6 Courts subsequently added joint and several liability to the statutory imposiwhich are defined as such by the [NJDEP] after public hearing including, but not limited to the "list of hazardous substances" set forth in
Appendix A of N.J.A.C. 7:IE, and which shall be consistent with, to
the maximum extent possible and which shall include, a list of hazardous substances adopted by the Environmental Protection Agency pursuant to section 311 of the "Federal Water Pollution Control Act
Amendments of 1972" (33 U.S.C. § 1321) and the list of toxic pollutants designated by Congress or the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency pursuant to Section 307 of that Act (33 U.S.C. § 1317); except
that sewage and sewage sludge shall not be considered as hazardous
substances for the purposes of the Act and this subchapter.
NJ. ADMIN. CODE tit. 7, § 7:1E-5.3 (1990).
10 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:10A-6 (West 1982). Specifically, the statute allows:
exempt[ion] [of] the following categories or discharge, in whole or in
part, from the requirements of obtaining a permit under this act; provided, however, that [the] exemption . . .shall not limit the civil or
criminal liability of any discharger nor exempt any discharger from
approval or permit requirements under any other provision of law....
Id. See also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:10-23.1lc (West 1982 & Supp. 1990) (prohibition of
hazardous substance discharges shall not apply to discharges "pursuant to and in
compliance with the conditions of a Federal or State permit."). The law also creates a Spill Fund, financed by taxes levied on the chemical and petroleum industries, to underwrite the costs of remediation.
I' N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:10-23.11g(c) (West 1982).
12 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:10-23f(a) (West 1982 & Supp. 1990).
13 Id. See also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:10-23.11f(a) (West 1982 & Supp. 1990).
14 See supra note 1.
15 Hazardous substances as defined by CERCLA are generally the same as under
the Spill Act except that petroleum products are excluded. CERCLA § 101(14)
(1980) (amended 1986), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) (1982 & Supp. IV 1987); see also 51
Fed. Reg. 34534 (1986) (provides tables of hazardous substances and their reportable quantities (RQ) and the notification requirements that a discharger must follow
if his discharged hazardous substance reaches or exceeds its RQ).
16 Specifically, PRPs consist of owners and operators who currently own or operate the site or did so at a time hazardous substances were released, generators, and
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The USEPA is authorized to, and has entered into, cooperative agreements with New Jersey whereby the state may act as
lead agency in responding to the release of hazardous substances.18 Such agreements may be limited to specific or regional
sites, or extended to cover sites throughout the entire state.
Thus, NJDEP enforcement activities performed at a site are primarily under the aegis of CERCLA, and secondarily under the
aegis of the Spill Act.' 9 This dual jurisdiction often complicates
the remediation process, and as will be shown, particularly inhibits settlement negotiations. As noted, New Jersey's settlement
policies and procedures are markedly different from federal policies and procedures. It is this author's view that the relative policies and procedures are unfortunately and unnecessarily
different, and that thereby the goals underlying the enactment of
both CERCLA and the Spill Act are ill served.
III.

FEDERAL SETTLEMENT POLICIES, PROCEDURES, AND

INCENTIVES, AND NEW JERSEY'S CORRELATIVES

The underlying assumption of this article is that equitable
settlements are a desirable goal from the vantages of all stakeholders, including governmental agencies, parties directly involved in the cleanup, public interest groups, and the general
public. It is recognized that not everyone shares this belief. This
author posits, based upon experience, that a legislative and administrative climate favoring settlements results in more efficient,
expeditious, and cost effective remediations than a climate promoting single-minded enforcement. Admittedly, there will be
certain transporters of hazardous substances. See CERCLA § 107(a)(1-4) (1980)
(amended 1986), 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (a) (1-4) (1982 & Supp. IV 1984).
17 See, e.g., United States v. Stringfellow, 661 F. Supp. 1053, 1060 (C.D. Cal.
1987) (defendants can be found jointly and severally liable if the single harm complained of "is theoretically or practically indivisible"); United States v. Chem-Dyne
Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 808 (S.D. Ohio 1983) (the words "joint and several liability" were excluded from the pre-1986 amended CERCLA so that the courts could
determine on a case-by-case basis the strict, joint and several liability of each defendant under common law principles).
18 See CERCLA § 104(c) & (d) (1980) (amended 1986), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(c) &

(d) (1982 & Supp. IV 1987). In such circumstances the state must agree to pay
10% of the cost. The state, however, will be responsible for 50% of the cost if, at
the time of the hazardous substance disposal, the site was owned by the state or a
state subdivision. Id. § 104(c)(3), § 9604(c)(3).
19 The only exception is where the discharge is solely of petroleum, which constitutes a hazardous substance only under the Spill Act. See N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 7,

§ 7:1E-5.3 (1990).
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extraordinary cases where real risk to public health will leave little room for compromise. Most experienced practitioners will
agree, however, that the vast majority of sites on the National
Priorities List (NPL),'2 or subject to Spill Act jurisdiction can be
successfully remediated through settlement.
A.

Settlement Policy

In 1986, Congress articulated a clear policy that the "President 2 ' shall act to facilitate agreements. . . that are in the public
interest and consistent with the National Contingency Plan
[NCP]2 2 in order to expedite effective remedial actions and minimize litigation. ' 2 3 If the USEPA chooses not to negotiate, it
must notify the PRPs in writing and state the reasons why it has
decided against negotiation.2 4 While this exercise of discretion is
not judicially reviewable, 25 Congress clearly expressed its intent
to favor settlements by forcing the government to publicly articulate why it will not negotiate, and by providing incentives and
procedures to facilitate and achieve settlements.
The Spill Act does not contain any comparable provision or
even any state legislative disposition toward settlement. Further,
NJDEP regulations, public policy considerations, and administrative practices all fail to recognize the virtues of negotiation or set
forth procedural guidelines defining the negotiation process.
Therefore, the Spill Act ought to be amended to adopt and adapt
the language of section 122(a) to express legislative support and
encouragement for the settlement alternative; this change would
20 The NPL is a list that Congress requires the USEPA to develop and maintain
in order to ensure that scarce resources are used to clean up sites presenting "the
greatest danger to public health or welfare or the environment." CERCLA
§ 105(8)(b) (1980) (amended 1986), 42 U.S.C. 9605(8)(b) (1982 & Supp. IV 1987).
21 By Executive Order 12580 (Jan. 23, 1987), the President delegated his authority under CERCLA to the USEPA. 52 Fed. Reg. 2923 (1987).
22 The National Contingency Plan is the national blueprint for remedial action
under Superfund, and the National Priorities List is a major component of the National Contingency Plan. See CERCLA § 105, 42 U.S.C. § 9605. See also 52 Fed.
Reg. 2923 (1987). The regulation specifically states:
The National Contingency Plan ("the NCP") shall provide for a National Response Team ("the NRT") composed of representatives of
appropriate Federal departments and agencies for national planning
and coordination of preparedness and response actions, and regional
response teams as the regional counterpart to the NRT for planning
and coordination of regional preparedness and response actions.
Id.
23 SARA § 122(a) (1986), 42 U.S.C. § 9622(a) (1988).
24 Id. For special notification procedures see id. § 122(e)(1), § 9622(e)(1).
25 Id. § 122(b)(2), § 9622(b)(2).
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remove any doubt as to whether the NJDEP possesses the authority to settle such cases.
B.

Settlement Procedures
1. The Key to Successful Negotiations: Information

If the USEPA exercises its discretion to negotiate a site, it
provides the PRPs with information in its possession; including
the names and addresses of all known PRPs, the volume and nature of the substances contributed by each PRP, and a ranking by
volume contributed.2 6 This compilation of information is known
as the "waste-in" list. Without such data, it is nearly impossible
to commence serious negotiations among the PRPs.
The USEPA also has discretion to issue nonbinding preliminary allocations of responsibility (NBARs) as an aid to negotiations.2 7 The NBAR is based on such factors as volume, toxicity,
mobility, strength of evidence, ability to pay, litigation risks, public interests, precedential value, and other equitable or aggravating factors. 28 The NBAR is inadmissible as evidence and wholly
unreviewable. 29 The USEPA will, on request, provide a general
explanation of its rationale for preparing the NBAR and will
make available all information collected in the process.
Prior to SARA, the USEPA refused to become involved in
the allocation of responsibility and forced PRPs to deal with the
issue inter sese. Even with Congressional blessing, the USEPA remains reluctant to use NBARs, blaming its disinclination on a
lack of financial resources. This reluctance, however, is unjustified because the cost of developing NBARs can be recovered as
30
part of the response costs.
NBARs are an invaluable impetus to serious negotiations in
that they place both real and psychological pressure on PRPs
who might otherwise attempt to stonewall the process, or bargain
unfairly. An additional advantage is that NBARs compel the
SARA § 122(e)(1) (A), (B) & (C), 42 U.S.C. § 9622(e)(1)(A), (B) & (C).
SARA § 122(e)(3)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 9622(e)(3)(A). See 52 Fed. Reg. 19919,
19920 (1987). NBARs were created "to promote settlement and, thus, minimiz[e]
transaction costs."; "an NBAR must be conducted in a fair, efficient and pragmatic
manner").
28 Id. USEPA may collect this information through subpoenas or the issuance of
general information request letters. See id. § 122(e)(30(B), § 9622(e)(3)(B). Specifically, the Act states that "the (USEPA) may by subpoena require the attendance
and testimony of witnesses and the production of reports, papers, documents, answers to questions, and other information that the [USEPA] deems necessary." Id.
29 Id. § 122(e)(3)(C), § 9622(e)(3)(C).
30 See SARA § 122(e)(3)(D), 42 U.S.C. § 9622(e)(3)(D).
26
27
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USEPA staff to analyze and evaluate a case early in the remediation process.
The Spill Act does not contain a provision for the dissemination of any information to PRPs. As a matter of practice, the
NJDEP opens its case files to PRPs upon deciding to pursue a
negotiated settlement alternative. The NJDEP normally will not
provide a "waste-in" list or "ranking"'" of the parties. Thus, parties have the burden of gaining access to the often voluminous
and disorganized NJDEP files, and searching these files for clues
to their own and other PRPs' involvement with the site. This
process often results in PRPs gaining differing views as to the
degree of each parties' culpability, making for difficult, confused
and protracted negotiations.
The lack of a uniform data base, as well as a preliminary and
nonbinding ranking of the PRPs, seriously and adversely impacts
negotiations. Parties become insecure about their position and
uncertain about the positions of other parties. This confusion
leads to an unwillingness to resolve even interim allocations of
the costs of remediation. The lack of data and the NJDEP's preliminary view of responsibility can, and sometimes does, create
an insurmountable obstacle to a successful settlement.
This author recommends that the Spill Act be amended to
compel the NJDEP to prepare and provide PRPs with a waste-in
list whenever it elects to pursue the settlement alternative. The
NJDEP should also be granted the discretion and encouragement
needed to prepare NBARs in conformity with and parallel to the
authority granted the USEPA in SARA. Such changes would not
only serve to promote settlements, but would also provide for a
more efficient remediation process.
2.

Schedules and Moratoria

If the USEPA determines that a period of negotiations might
facilitate a settlement, it issues a notice to all PRPs.3 Once a
notice is issued, the USEPA may not commence either a response
action 33 or an enforcement action 34 for 120 days, nor may it com31 SARA § 122(e)(1) (1986), 42 U.S.C. § 9622(e)(1) (Supp. IV 1987). See supra
notes 24 and 26.
32 Id.
33 See CERCLA § 104(a) (1980) (amended 1986); 42 U.S.C. § 9604.
Specifically, a response action is provided for in the statute as:
Whenever (A) any hazardous substance is released or there is a substantial threat of such a release into the environment ...the [USEPA]
is authorized to act, consistent with the national contingency plan, to
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mence a remedial investigation and feasibility study (RI/FS) 5 for
ninety days. The PRPs have sixty days following receipt of the
notice in which to make a good faith offer to either perform the
RI/FS or undertake the cleanup of the site.3 6 If no offer is made
during this moratorium, the USEPA may commence an action
under either section 106 or section 104.
The statutory moratorium is a minimum period. The
USEPA will typically extend it if, in its judgment, substantial progress has been made toward an acceptable settlement. The
USEPA sets a realistic schedule depending upon the circumstances of each particular case. Generally, although not specifiremove or arrange for the removal of, and provide for remedial action
relating to such hazardous substance

. . .

or take any other response

measure. . . which the [USEPA] deems necessary to protect the public
health or welfare or the environment....
Id.
See CERCLA § 106(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a).
An enforcement action, referred to in the statute as an abatement action, may
be commenced as follows:
[Wihen the [USEPA] determines that there may be an imminent and
substantial endangerment to the public health or welfare of the environment because of an actual or threatened release of a hazardous
34

substance .

.

. [the USEPA] may require the Attorney General of the

United States to secure such relief as may be necessary to abate such
danger or threat, and the district court of the United States in the
district in which the threat occurs shall have jurisdiction to grant such
relief as the public interest and the equities of the case may require.
Id.
35 SARA § 122(e)(2)(A) (1986), 42 U.S.C. § 9622(e)(2)(A) (Supp. IV 1987). An
RI/FS is authorized under SARA § 104(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a), and must be conducted in accordance with SARA § 111, 42 U.S.C. § 9622. See SARA § 104(a), 42
U.S.C. § 9604(a).
An RI/FS has been described as a study undertaken by the lead
agency conducting the remedial action to determine the nature and
extent of the threat presented by the release and to evaluate proposed
remedies. This includes sampling, monitoring, and exposure assessment, as necessary, and includes the gathering of sufficient information to determine the necessity for and proposed extent of remedial
action. Part of the RI/FS may involve assessing whether the threat
can be prevented or minimized by controlling the source of the contamination at or near the area where the hazardous substances were
originally located.., and/or whether additional actions will be necessary because the hazardous substances have migrated from the area of

or near their original location ....

United States v. Bell Petroleum Serv., Inc., 734 F. Supp. 771, 783 (W.D. Tex.
1990).
36 SARA § 122(e)(2)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 9622(e)(2)(B). A good faith offer is not
defined in the statute. It, however, must be sufficient in its terms to at least warrant
the opening of negotiations and should demonstrate willingness and financial capability of the PRPs to perform.
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cally set forth in the statute, if the PRPs decline to perform the
RI/FS phase of the cleanup, the USEPA will provide them a further opportunity to negotiate after the completion of the RI/FS
or at subsequent phases of the cleanup procedure.
There are no comparable procedures under state law.3 7 The
Spill Act simply authorizes the NJDEP to either perform the
38
cleanup itself or to direct the dischargers to do so.
In most cases, however, the NJDEP chooses to negotiate. In
some instances the NJDEP will set strict time limits on the negotiation period, and in other instances it will adapt to the realities of
the situation. The degree of flexibility will vary based on the significance of general factors: the nature of the site, the character
and financial stability of the PRPs, the level of public and media
attention, the personality of the NJDEP representative, and the
real or perceived health risks.
Public interest and the settlement process would benefit by
an articulated procedure similar to that set forth in CERCLA.
Such a procedure could best be established either through legislation or through an administrative promulgation of NJDEP
guidelines. The best solution would be the enactment of a fixed,
though discretionary, statutory negotiation moratorium.
C.

Settlement Incentives

The larger significance of SARA's section 122 settlement regime is found in its substantive provisions, dealing with the critical issues of contribution rights, de minimis treatment of minor
PRPs, covenants not to sue, and mixed funding. With these
grants of discretionary authority and legal rights, Congress created a series of genuine inducements to the achievement of expeditious remediations through settlements.
1.

Contribution

Among the most important inducements to settlement are
the contribution provisions of SARA. Federal law now recognizes that a PRP who has paid more than its fair share has a contribution claim against other PRPs for the excess cleanup costs.
Conversely, settling PRPs are protected against claims for contri37 See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 58:10-23.1 la to z (West 1982 & Supp. 1990), N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 7, §§ 7:IE-1.I to 5.10 (1990).
38 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:10-23.11f. If

the NJDEP determines that it will be
done "properly and expeditiously", it may allow private parties to perform the
cleanup. N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 7, § 2.3(a).
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bution by nonsettlers. Therefore, a PRP who has paid or agreed
to pay response costs may seek contribution from any other party
who may be liable during or following any civil or administrative
action under section 106 or section 107(a). 39 Additionally, a
party who has settled with the USEPA in an administrative orjudicially approved agreement is not liable for contribution claims
40
for any matter addressed in the settlement agreement.
Although nonsettling parties forfeit this protection, their potential liability is reduced by the amount of the settlement. 41 Either
the USEPA or in some circumstances the state, may sue a nonsettling party for the remaining remediation and response costs,
and where relevant, treble damages. 4 2
Under New Jersey law, the right of contribution is generally
governed by the interplay between the Comparative Negligence
39 See CERCLA §§ 106 & 107(a) (1980) (amended 1986), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9606 &
9607(a) (1982 & Supp. IV 1987). For a discussion of action under § 106, see supra
note 33. Under § 107, liable parties are set forth as:
(1) the owner and operator of a vessel (otherwise subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States) or a facility,
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned or operated any facility at which such hazardous substances were disposed of,
(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for disposal or treatment, or arranged with a transporter for
transport for disposal or treatment, of hazardous substances owned
or possessed by such person, by any other party or entity, at any facility owned or operated by another party or entity and containing such
hazardous substances, and
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances
for transport to disposal or treatment facilities or sites selected by
such person, from which causes the incurrence of response costs, of a
hazardous substance, shall be liable for(A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the United
States Government or a State not inconsistent with the national contingency plan;
(B) any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other
person consistent with the national contingency plan; and
(C) damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural resources, including the reasonable costs of assessing such injury, destruction, or loss resulting from such a release.
Id. § 107(a), § 9607(a).
See also SARA § 113(f)(1) (1986), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1) (Supp. IV 1987) (providing equitable relief; "[i]n resolving contribution claims, the court may allocate
response costs among liable parties using such equitable factors as the court determines are appropriate").
40 SARA § 113(f)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(2). Settling PRPs will generally negotiate their rights and obligations inter sese within the terms of the settlement
agreement.
41 Id.
42 Id. § 113(f)(3)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 9613()(3)(A).
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Act4 3 and the Joint Tortfeasors Contribution Law. 44 Pursuant to
these authorities, if a joint tortfeasor settles for more or less than
his pro rata share, the amount of the plaintiff's claim is reduced
pro rata. As a result, a contribution action against the settler is
barred.4 5 Consequently, if a joint tortfeasor pays more than his
pro rata share, he cannot sue a settling co-defendant for the excess. Such ajoint tortfeasor may, of course, sue a nonsettling codefendant for the excess.
These rules are not necessarily put into play for settlements
under either CERCLA or the Spill Act.4 6 It is not unusual for a
PRP to settle with the NJDEP for more than its pro rata share,
because of the threats of both strict or joint and several liability,
and treble damages for failure to respond to an administrative
order.4 7 It might appear, in the first instance, that the Joint
Tortfeasors Contribution Act would enable a PRP to seek contribution from nonsettlors for the excess above its pro rata share.4 8
This situation, however, raises some questions. First, are PRPs
considered "tortfeasors"? Second, what is a PRP's pro rata share
and how is it established? These issues remain unanswered. It is
anticipated that a New Jersey court would utilize its equitable
43 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-51 (West 1987) (in negligence actions the fact finder
is to determine what percent of liability is attributable to each party).
44 Id. § 2A:53A-1 (West 1987) (a joint tortfeasor who had paid more than his pro
rata share can obtain contribution from another joint tortfeasor for the excess).
45 See Tefft v. Tefft, 192 N.J. Super. 561, 570, 471 F.2d 790, 795 (App. Div.
1983) (under Comparative Negligence Act nonsettling defendant has no claim
against settler for contribution where percentages of negligence appropriately determined by fact finder). Cf. Young v. Latta, 233 N.J. Super. 520, 524, 559 A.2d
465, 467 (App. Div. 1989), cert. denied, 117 N.J. 665, 569 A.2d 1357 (1989) ("as a
matter of law . . . settlement dismisses not only the plaintiff's claims but also all
crossclaims against the settling defendant"); Theobald v. Angelos, 44 N.J. 228, 232,
208 A.2d 129, 131 (1965) (settlement bars action for contribution against settler).
46 In reviewing a proposed consent agreement, a federal court considers only
the reasonableness of the settlement, not the proportionate liability of each PRP.
See United States v. Acton Corp., 733 F. Supp. 869, 872-73 (D.N.J. 1990) (court
reviewed a proposed consent agreement; "[i]t is not our function to determine
whether a better settlement could be calculated, but only whether the existing settlement is reasonable.").
47 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:10-23.11(0(a) (West 1982 & Supp. 1990). Cf. In re
Kimber Petroleum Corp., 110 N.J. 69, 84, 539 A.2d 1181, 1188 (1988) (in enforcement of a directive NJDEP "may seek treble damages as a penalty for noncompliance").
48 At the time of this writing, proposed amendments to the Spill Act would resolve any question as to the settlers contribution rights. Additionally, settling parties would obtain the added incentive that, with the approval of the NJDEP, they
may obtain treble damages from the nonsettling party unless the latter can show
good cause. S. 2657 and A. No. 3659, (Senate Committee Substitute, Dec. 10,
1990).
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power in an appropriate case and uphold such a contribution
claim. Nevertheless, the uncertainties remain.
The question of whether a nonsettling PRP can seek and obtain contribution against a settling PRP is also left unanswered.
From a legal standpoint, because the settlement under the Spill
Act does not involve an interplay between comparative negligence and contribution laws, the statutory rationale for the insulation against contribution actions would not apply because there
would be no finding of pro rata fault. Further, in the context of
environmental cleanups, the issue of fault allocation is extremely
complex and involves the same factors that support NBARs including volume, toxicity, and degree of care. 49 Accordingly, because pro rata fault allocation plays no role in Spill Act
administrative consent orders, or in administrative orders or
judgments, settling PRPs or PRPs that respond to orders orjudgments are not necessarily immune from contribution claims by
nonsettling parties. Indeed, it would appear that common law
rules of contribution would make settling parties amenable to
claims by nonsettlers who are subsequently compelled to pay
costs in excess of their fair share.
This uncertainty carries over into CERCLA which delegates
to the state the authority to handle the remediation.5 ° In matters
arising solely under Spill Act jurisdiction, the NJDEP is without
express authority to provide settling PRPs with contribution protection against third parties. Ordinarily, when the NJDEP is the
lead agency at a CERCLA site, a settlement results in a state administrative consent order (ACO).51 Federal settlements must,
with certain exceptions, be approved by the United States Attorney General and presented to an appropriate federal district
court for approval. 52 The court must allow a thirty-day comment
period after public notice and will approve the settlement if consistent with CERCLA.5 s Therefore, unless the state ACO is
adopted by the USEPA in a federal administrative settlement, or
the USEPA accedes to the ACO's judicial approval in the federal
district court, a PRP will not enjoy the contribution protections
afforded by section 113(f)(2) of SARA.54
49 See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
50

See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.

51 See, e.g., NJDEP ACO ofJanuary 24, 1989, at the GEMS site.
52

See SARA § 122(d)(1)(A) (1986), 42 U.S.C. § 9622(d)(1)(A) (Supp. IV 1987).

53 Id. § 122(d)(2)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 9622(d)(2)(A).
54

For a discussion of § 113(f)(2), see supra notes 39 & 40 and accompanying
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It is probable that neither the USEPA nor the federal district
courts would adopt a state ACO merely for the purpose of affording state PRPs contribution protection without the full application of relevant federal procedural and substantive requirements.
Thus, parties settling with the NJDEP are deprived of significant
protections, even if the site is on the NPL and its remediation is
under the aegis of CERCLA.
The appropriate and recommended course of action is to
amend the Spill Act to provide all of the contribution protections
granted to settling parties by SARA. This author further recommends that such an amendment provide some residual discretion
in the state courts to allow for contribution by nonsettlers in
cases of extraordinary iniquity. This change would shield PRPs
from both collusive settlement agreements and agreements that
are the product of a state agency's arbitrary and capricious
conduct.
2.

De Minims Settlements

Through SARA, Congress encouraged the USEPA to
promptly settle with de minimis parties.55 These parties are those
who, for some equitable reason, are responsible for only a minor
portion of the cleanup costs. 5 6 Such parties will ordinarily pay a

premium to settle promptly in order to avoid the significant
transaction and legal costs which attend remediation procedures.
The Spill Act does not provide the authority, nor does it encourage the NJDEP to settle with de minimis parties. In practice,
the NJDEP will not even consider buying out minor parties, and
thus will not engage in such negotiations. This results in exposing de minimis parties who are subject to state jurisdiction not only
to the injustice of the statutory scheme of strict or joint and several liability, but also to the manipulation of major parties at the
55 See SARA § 122(g)(1) (1986), 42 U.S.C. § 9 622(g)(1) (Supp. IV 1987).
56 SARA expressly defines generators as such parties who have contributed
waste which is minimal in volume and toxicity "in comparison to other hazardous
substances at the facility." Id. § 122(g)(1)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 9622(g)(1)(A), and owners who did not contribute hazardous substances to the site, were not otherwise
involved as a generator or transporter, or purchased the property without real or
constructive knowledge of the contamination. Id. § 122(g)(l)(b), 42 U.S.C.
§ 9622(g)(1)(B). USEPA deems one percent or less as the cutoff for de minimis treatment of generators. It is noteworthy that the innocent landowner defense under
CERCLA § 107(b)(3) is merely identical to the de minimis landowner definition except that under the former the landowner has the added obligation to affirmatively
conduct an environmental audit to qualify. See CERCLA § 107(b)(3) (1980)
(amended 1986), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3) (1982 & Supp. IV 1987).
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site. Consequently, major parties are motivated to coerce minor
parties into paying a significant share of the costs beyond any
concept of their pro rata share. This coercion is coupled with the
threat that minor parties who do not cooperate with the settlement can be held liable to the state for treble damages or other
statutory penalties, and to other parties for contribution.5 7 To
further exasperate the situation, a minor party's claim that it
would have had to pay an unjust amount does not constitute a
"good faith" defense to a treble damage action.
Moreover, cases are now unfolding under CERCLA in which
private parties are implicating small businesses and individuals as
PRPs for contributing household hazardous wastes through municipal contractors, or at contaminated municipal sites. The Spill
Act's broad liability language invites this type of litigation and
may even tempt the NJDEP to extend its reach to individual
household generators. Without the authority and the commitment to an equitably administered de minimis settlement program,
such cases could result in serious societal problems.
Accordingly, it is recommended that New Jersey adopt the
SARA de minimis provisions, but with the following changes. With
respect to de minimis generators, the standard should be changed
to provide that the toxicity of the substance be minimal in comparison to other hazardous substances. At most sites, all generators are typically responsible for the same kinds of spent
chemicals and solvents. It is nearly impossible to prove that one
substance is less toxic than others. It is hard to believe that Congress intended to deny de minimis standing to small contributors
who sent significantly lower quantities of the same kind of substances than high-volume contributors.
Further, SARA does not protect those parties whose connection to a site is based upon inconclusive or ambiguous evidence.5 9 The NJDEP should be given discretion to offer de
minimis settlements to these parties. Rather than forcing these
minor parties to endure the transaction costs of the cleanup pro57 If the bill allowing treble damages on behalf of settling parties in private contribution suits is enacted, the injustices worked upon minor parties will be compounded. See supra note 48.
58 See supra note 46.
59 These parties would be ones in which there is no concrete evidence connecting them to a particular site or facility. For example, consider the situation where a
generator sent his waste to site A, and it is known that some wastes from site A were
sent to site B. In such a case it can never be known for certain whether or not the
generator's wastes are to be found at site B.
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cess, or to incur the risks of treble damages, both justice and the
public interest would be better served by allowing de minimis
settlements.
3.

Covenants Not to Sue

Releases are a primary incentive for settlement. Congress
has authorized the USEPA to grant releases in remediation actions on condition that: (1) the release is in the public interest;
(2) the release will expedite a response consistent with the
NCP;6 ° (3) the parties fully comply with the consent decree; and
(4) the USEPA approves the response action. 6' The statutory
"guiding principle" is that the more permanent the remedy, the
more complete the release.6 2
One can deduce from this principle that these covenants are
not complete releases, but include a variety of exceptions. These
exceptions are known in the parlance of the environmental bar as
"reopeners." For instance, the USEPA may make a claim against
released PRPs for future liability stemming from conditions unknown at the time the remediation was completed. 63 The USEPA
may also include reopeners for any circumstance "necessary and
appropriate to assure protection of public health, welfare, and
the environment." '6 In short, the USEPA may design releases as
porous, or as airtight as the public interest requires 6 5 and the
See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
SARA § 122(f)(1) (1986), 42 U.S.C. § 9622(0)(1) (Supp. IV 1987).
Id. § 122(c), 42 U.S.C. § 9622(c).
Id. § 122(f)(6)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 9622(0)(6)(A).
Id. § 122(f)(6)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 9622(f)(6)(C).
Public interest factors are expressly set forth as:
(A) The effectiveness and reliability of the remedy, in light of the
other alternative remedies considered for the facility concerned.
(B) The nature of the risks remaining at the facility.
(C) The extent to which performance standards are included in
the order or decree.
(D) The extent to which the response action provides a complete
remedy for the facility, including a reduction in the hazardous nature
of the substances at the facility.
(E) The extent to which the technology used in the response action is demonstrated to be effective.
(F) Whether the Fund or other sources of funding would be available for any additional remedial actions that might eventually be necessary at the facility.
(G) Whether the remedial action will be carried out, in whole or
in significant part, by the responsible parties themselves.
Id. § 122(0(4)(A)-(G), 42 U.S.C. § 9622()(4)(A)-(G). The release takes effect when
the USEPA certifies that the remedial action has been completed and the party has
performed satisfactorily. See id. § 122(f)(3) & (5), § 9622(f)(3) & (5).
60
61
62
63
64
65
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circumstances warrant.
The USEPA must grant complete re66
leases in two situations.
First, a complete release must issue
where a PRP proposes a remedial plan consistent with the NCP
providing for on-site disposal, and the USEPA rejects it in favor
of off-site disposal.6 7 Second, such a release is granted where the
remedy will destroy or permanently immobilize all hazardous
constituents so as to eliminate any foreseeable significant risk. 68
While these are not the kinds of releases lawyers like to craft
to fully protect their clients, they do provide some level of comfort to a settling PRP in the context of an otherwise draconian
liability scheme. Such releases serve to protect PRPs against future liability for all known conditions absent a severe future public health risk. In addition, if the PRPs perform their obligations
satisfactorily, they will be protected even if the remedy fails.
The Spill Act does not provide for releases. Accordingly, the
NJDEP takes the position that it will grant the narrowest of covenants in any settlement. Thus far, the NJDEP only has waived its
enforcement claims under a directive 69 when a settling party satisfactorily completes its remedial undertakings. 70 It is true, however, that the NJDEP could not sue on a directive once it has
been satisfied, whether or not the NJDEP expressly undertakes
not to sue. Such a release is an empty promise, devoid of legal
significance. This lean concession falls far short of its federal
counterpart, which offers a covenant not to sue with respect to
any matter covered in an ACO. As previously noted, the two exceptions to this general rule are for new response costs caused by
unknown conditions, and new scientific information received after the execution of the ACO, which creates a condition threatening to public health and welfare.
The federal covenant not to sue, even with reopeners for unknown future problems, is a substantial inducement to settle.
Under ordinary circumstances, an attorney would not recommend a settlement to a client that does not resolve a conflict
without achieving some degree of finality under the circumstances. In settlements with the NJDEP, there is not only an in66

Id. § 122(f)(2)(A) & (B), 42 U.S.C. § 9622(0(2)(A) & (B).

67 Id.
68 Id.
69 A directive

is an administrative order issued by the NJDEP compelling a PRP

to commence cleanup of a contaminated site. See NJ. STAT. ANN. § 58:1023.11(0(a) (West 1982 & Supp. 1990).
70 See, e.g., the Administrative Consent Order in the GEMS proceeding, January

24, 1989.
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adequate resolution of the underlying conflict, but also a high
degree of uncertainty as to the finality of the situation.
To remedy this situation, it is recommended that the NJDEP
exercise its implicit authority to offer covenants not to sue in settlements at least as broad as those specifically provided in CERCLA. New Jersey courts have generously granted implicit
authority to the NJDEP, derived from broad grants of statutory
power to remediate discharges. 7 ' Certainly, a fair covenant not
to sue, which induces and expedites efficient site remediation and
protects the public interest, would withstand any challenge that it
was not expressly authorized.
The NJDEP's history of inaction can only be corrected if the
New Jersey legislature adopts the provisions of SARA section
122(f). Additionally, the NJDEP should be given authority to
grant complete covenants, not only in those cases where the remedy is securely permanent, but also in cases where a party contributed significantly in excess of its recognized fair share of
remediation costs.
4.

Mixed Funding

The USEPA is authorized to contribute a share of the costs
from the Superfund as a means of achieving fair and expeditious
settlements. Specifically, SARA permits the USEPA to reimburse
with interest, the parties to the agreement from the Fund 72 for
certain costs of actions under the agreement that the parties have
73
agreed to perform, but which the USEPA has agreed to finance.
Thereafter, the USEPA would pursue others to recover the monies expended from the Fund.
Generally, such mixed funding is intended to be used in two
situations. First, where an individual or group, of recalcitrant
PRPs are holding up a settlement, the USEPA may contribute
their share to expedite the cleanup and then pursue a recovery
action. Next, where there is a significant "orphan share, ' ' 74 and it
71 See, e.g., In re Kimber Petroleum Corp., 110 N.J. 69, 74, 539 A.2d 1181, 118384 (1988) ("DEP has the discretion, implicit in its broad implied powers, to require
responsible polluters to pay for cleanup or removal costs prior to remedial
action.").
72 The "Fund" is the "Hazardous Substance Superfund" which was established
under 26 U.S.C. § 9507(a) (1988). This trust fund, known as the "Superfund," was
established to pay expenses necessary to carry out CERCLA. See 26 U.S.C.
§ 9507(C) (1988).
73 SARA § 122(b)(1) (1986), 42 U.S.C. 9622(b)(1) (1988).
74 The term "orphan share" refers to the amount of the remediation costs which
settling PRPs cannot or do not elect to contribute. Under SARA § 122(b), the

1006

SETON HALL L4 W REVIEW

[Vol. 21:988

would be inequitable to compel the cooperative PRPs to cover it,
the USEPA may use mixed funding to achieve a settlement despite joint and several liability.
The USEPA is understandably reticent about mixed funding
for fear that it will become a negotiating point at every site. On
the other hand, mixed funding can be a useful and appropriate
device that serves the goals of CERCLA. While the Spill Act
does not expressly provide for mixed funding, there is apparent
authority for its implementation. The statute provides that either
the NJDEP may remove the discharge or direct the discharger to
do so. 7 5 Whenever the NJDEP opts to remove the discharge it-

self, it may draw upon the Fund to pay all cleanup costs. 7 6 There
is no express provision for a Fund withdrawal for a partial
cleanup. In In re Kimber Petroleum Corp., 7 the New Jersey
Supreme Court upheld the NJDEP's implied authority to direct a
discharger to perform the cleanup and maintain control of the
process, an option not expressly contemplated by the Spill Act.7 8
It would seem a short logical step to imply the authority to draw
upon the Fund to partially remove a discharge where most of the
costs are being incurred by other parties.
The NJDEP does not engage in mixed funding, and it is not
an option within the Spill Act's negotiation scheme. Yet, it certainly should be an option in appropriate cases. It is recommended that the Spill Act be amended to expressly grant the
NJDEP the authority to engage in mixed funding where: (1) recalcitrant parties representing orphan shares are inhibiting expeditious settlement; (2) full payment of all costs by cooperative
parties would be substantially inequitable; (3) the public interest
is served; and (4) the NJDEP is given broad authority to pursue
and recover the Fund share from nonsettlers.
USEPA can provide for these funds and later seek reimbursement from the relevant
parties. Such an action helps expedite the cleanup process.
75 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:10-23.11(f)(a) (West 1982 & Supp. 1990).
76 Id.
77 110 N.J. 69, 539 A.2d 1181 (1988).
78 Id. at 74, 539 A.2d at 1183-84. Specifically, the New Jersey Supreme Court
maintained:
[The] DEP's practice of requiring payment by responsible parties
while maintaining control itself over remedial actions is not directly
authorized by the Spill Act. Nevertheless, DEP's ability directly to undertake removal of a discharge, thereby assuring the elimination of
toxic contamination while concomitantly securing removal costs from
responsible parties, would appear to be highly necessary as a means of
effective enforcement of the Spill Act.
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CONCLUSION

While this article is not an exhaustive compilation of settlement authorities and issues under CERCLA and the Spill Act, its
purpose has been to highlight the major differences between the
two. Those differences are real and substantive, and in the author's view have retarded the expeditious resolution of remediation conflicts in this state.
Despite the imposition of strict and joint liability on persons
in any way connected to a contaminated site, the hammer of
treble damages for failure to comply with NJDEP orders, the deprivation of pre-enforcement judicial review, and for many no judicial review,7 9 and the adamant refusal of the NJDEP to consider
even rudimentary equitable factors in allocating liability, the Spill
Act's goals have not been achieved."0 Very few of New Jersey's
contaminated sites have been remediated since 1976.
By no means is it suggested that the recommendations made
in this article are the only solutions to the problems identified
within the Spill Act's statutory scheme. Equitable, defined, and
purposeful settlement negotiations, however, could expedite and
achieve the cleanup of sites that are today enmeshed in unnecessary and complex legal maneuvering. A legislatively sanctioned
settlement policy and carefully crafted incentives and inducements, at least as good as, and hopefully better than those pro79 Courts have held that due process requirements are met if PRPs raise a "good
faith" defense after noncompliance and during a treble damage enforcement action, or if PRPs pay cleanup costs and then file a claim with the fund. See, e.g.,
Woodland DEP Private Study Group v. New Jersey, 616 F. Supp. 794, 805 (D.N.J.
1985) ("the requirement of due process is satisfied when a statute provides that a
party refusing to submit to an administrative consent order may avoid penalties for
noncompliance by demonstrating reasonable grounds for such disobedience [a
good faith defense]"). In most cases and for many PRPs, neither of these alternatives provides anything near the notice and hearing protections which is at the
heart of elemental due process. For many PRPs, paying the costs of a directive will
lead to insolvency, thus obviating any further litigation. For others, a lack ofjudicial guidance as to what constitutes a "good faith" defense simply forecloses assuming the risk of ruinous treble damages and daily penalties.
80 As of March, 1990, New Jersey had 109 sites on the NPL and 85 had not yet
received any federal remedial funding. See New Jersey's Waste Capacity Assurance
Plan of October, 1989. CERCLA has also been criticized for wasting cleanup
funds. Specifically, CERCLA has been criticized in the following manner:
One major fault is that too much money is going to transactional
costs, such as litigation ....

Based on the Environmental Protection

Agency's estimate that it will cost $14.6 billion to clean up 1,800 NPL
sites, the total legal costs incurred by the federal government and by
private parties would be more than $8 billion ....
21 ENVTL. REP. 759 (1990).
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vided for in SARA, should contribute to a more efficient
resolution of New Jersey's problems with contaminated sites.
Such a policy would begin to make navigable the waters of negotiated settlements.

